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1. INTRODUCTION
On December 19, 2012, UBS agreed to pay $1.5 billion to U.S.,
U.K., and Swiss authorities for intentionally manipulating the London
Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR").' This record-setting fine settles an
investigation by regulatory authorities into a massive scheme operated
by UBS traders to move LIBOR in directions beneficial to the bank.2
On June 27, 2012, Barclays pledged to pay a total of $453 million in
fines to the Commodities Future Trading Commission (CFTC), the U.S.
Justice Department, and the British Financial Services Authority
(FSA).3 This fine settled the probe into Barclays's manipulation of
LIBOR.4 These regulatory fines, however, represent just the beginning
of the potential fallout from the LIBOR scandal.5 The fines have set a
precedent for the fifteen other banks involved in setting LIBOR
("reference banks"), and have set the stage for borrowers around the
world to pursue a wide range of legal remedies.6 In fact, it took
Berkshire Bank less than a month after the Barclays fine to file a
massive class action suit in the Southern District of New York against
1. David Enrich & Jean Eaglesham, UBS Admits Rigging Rates in "Epic " Plot, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 20, 2012, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424127887324407504578188342618724274.html
[hereinafter Enrich & Eaglesham].
2. Id.
3. Joshua Gallu et al., Barclays LIBOR Fine Sends Stocks Lower as Probes Widen,
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-28/barclays-451-
million-LIBOR-fine-paves-the-way-for-competitors.html [hereinafter Gallu].
4. Alexandra Alper & Kristin Ridley, Barclays paying $453 million to settle LIBOR
probe, REUTERS (June 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/27/us-barclays-
libor-idUSBRE85QOJ720120627.
5. Gallu, supra note 3 ("'We expect that the cost of lawsuits related to LIBOR
manipulation will dwarf the fines imposed on Barclays,' said Sandy Chen, a banks analyst at
Cenkos Securities Plc in London, who is 'penciling in multi-year provisions that could run
into the billions."').
6. Id.
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the sixteen reference banks.7 The Federal Housing Finance Agency has
urged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to sue the reference banks now that
the findings of the UBS settlement have come to light.8 The Berkshire
Bank suit, and others like it, could result in enormous awards of
compensatory and punitive damages. Additionally, the LIBOR scandal
could allow debtors and other borrowers to invalidate financial contracts
and swap deals that use a fraudulently established LIBOR as the
reference rate.
The public reaction to the LIBOR scandal has spurred
government and regulatory officials into detailed examinations of the
LIBOR rate setting process that will pave the way for litigants.
Politicians turned the LIBOR scandal into political fodder for the 2012
presidential election race. 9 The House Financial Services Committee
has repeatedly criticized U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner for
his handling of the LIBOR scandal, despite his assertions that he
warned the British and U.S. regulators once he knew of the
manipulation.10 In the face of scrutiny from politicians and angry
consumers, the CFTC, the U.S. Justice Department, the FSA, and
attorneys general have moved quickly to gather the information
necessary to hold manipulators accountable. Investigations by
government and regulatory officials will be particularly useful to private
litigants because regulatory conclusions are admissible in private
litigation under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8).11
Sixteen banks submit quotes to Thomson Reuters for the
purpose of setting LIBOR. 12 The reference banks are Barclays, Bank of
7. Class Action Compl., Berkshire Bank v. Bank of America Corp. No. 12-CV-5723,
2012 W.L. 3024769 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (filed July 25, 2012, a mere 28 days after the fine was
issued).
8. Enrich & Eaglesham, supra note 1.
9. David Nakamura & Danielle Douglas, Timothy Geithner again under fire on




11. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(A) ("A record or statement of public office [is not excluded
by the rule against hearsay] if: . . . (iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal
case, factual findings from a legally authorized investigation .... ").
12. Factbox: Banks drawn into Libor rate-fixing scandal, REUTERS (July 11, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/1 1/us-banking-libor-panel-
idUSBRE86AOP02012071 1 [hereinafter Factbox]. In the wake of the financial crisis, the
BBA has changed its reference banks for USD LIBOR. The current panel is comprised of
eighteen banks and includes Bank of America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd.,
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America, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Lloyds, HSBC, HBOS (now a subsidiary of Lloyds),
JPMorgan, Rabobank, RBC, RBS, UBS, WestLB, and Norinchukin.
13
Each of these reference banks has faced some form of LIBOR-related
inquiry. Bank of America has received subpoenas and requests for
information from the Department of Justice, the CFTC, and the FSA in
the wake of the LIBOR scandal. 14  The FSA is also currently
investigating Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 1 5  New York and
Connecticut authorities have sent subpoenas to every single reference
bank) 6 RBS has entered into negotiations with regulators to reach a
settlement similar to the one reached by UBS and Barclays.1 7 Lloyd's
has received subpoenas from various British authorities regarding its
involvement in the LIBOR scandal. 18  Rabobank is cooperating with
various government authorities in their investigation into the LIBOR
scandal. 19 WestLB, now defunct, is also complying with regulatory
requests for documentation.20
Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citibank, Credit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC,
JPMorgan Chase, Lloyd's, Rabobank, Royal Bank of Canada, Socirt6 G~nrrale, Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation, Norinchukin, RBS, and UBS. US Dollar Panel, BBALIBOR
(May 2012) (last visited Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.bbaLIBOR.com/panels/usd.
13. Factbox, supra note 12.
14. Hugh Son, BofA Says LIBOR Probe Draws U.S. Subpoenas on Submissions,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-02/bofa-says-
LIBOR-probe-draws-u-s-subpoenas-on-submissions.html. The FSA is the UK's independent
financial regulating body. It is technically not a government organization and is "funded
entirely by the firms" it regulates, but answers to the Treasury. About the FSA, FINANCIAL
SERVICES AUTHORITY (last updated Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about.
15. Taiga Uranaka, Mitsubishi UFJ suspends third London banker over Libor probe,
REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/libor-btmu-
idUSL4E8J915620120809.
16. David McLaughlin, JPMorgan, UBS Said Among Banks Queried in Libor Probe,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-08-15/jpmorgan-
barclays-said-among-banks-to-get-Libor-subpoenas.html; Shahien Nasiripour, Nine More
Banks Added to Libor Probe, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 26, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f4e7960-I fla- 11e2-be82-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2DLnodOjT.
17. Max Colchester, RBS Seeks Pact on Libor, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 2012, at C3,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10001424052970204712904578094073885779486.html.
18. Matt Scuffham & Steve Slater, Lloyds pulled deeper into LIBOR probe, REUTERS
(July 26, 2012), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/07/26/uk-lloyds-results-
idUKBRE86PO7U20120726.
19. Press Release, Rabobank, Rabobank Interim Financial Information 2012: Robust
Position in Economic Downturn (Aug. 23, 2012), available at
https://www.rabobank.com/nl/images/20120823-PressRelease tcm43-167008.pdf.
20. Laura Stevens, Uproar Over Rate Reaches Germany, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July 19,
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These investigations have also triggered private litigation.
Guardian Care Homes, a residential care home corporation that holds
two swap agreements, is leading the charge in Britain with a suit against
Barclays. 2' In the United States, The Berkshire Bank class action,
ongoing in the Southern District of New York, will create a template for
U.S. litigants who are now waiting in the wings.22 The LIBOR scandal
presents an opportunity for affected counterparties to possibly recover
funds from banks using contract claims. LIBOR plaintiffs have pursued
various causes of action - fraud, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, antitrust, and unjust enrichment.23 These
claims, combining tort and contract law, provide attractive pathways for
recovery on LIBOR-related contracts. However, LIBOR plaintiffs have
not alleged mutual mistake and frustration of purpose claims.
Litigants will likely have success using contract claims to
recover on various financial contracts that used LIBOR as a crucial
benchmark. Notwithstanding the barriers to recovery posed by the
LIBOR calculation method itself, litigants can overcome these barriers
by using information published in detailed analytical studies and
findings from regulatory agency investigations. For example, a
regulatory agency may find emails and text messages between UBS
traders planning the faulty quote of the day. Findings such as these will
increase the likelihood of recovery for private plaintiffs.24  The
difficulties of proving collusion will more than likely prevent successful
antitrust claims. As such, plaintiffs should look to fraud, frustration of
purpose, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
and mutual mistake for improved chances of recovery.
This Note begins with observations on the calculation of
LIBOR. Part III looks at the incentives for altering this extremely
important rate and some of the analytical studies conducted on the
apparent manipulation. Then, Part IV discusses the wide variety of
2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI 0000872396390444097904577536802890068334.html.
21. Matt Scuffham, Barclays Libor case to go to trial, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/29/us-barclays-libor-idUSBRE89SOV120121029.
22. Jean Eaglesham, New York Lender Files Libor Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (July
30, 2012),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10000872396390444860104577557052131047024.html.
23. Am. Compl. at 97, In Re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation,
No. 11-MD-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. 2012) ; Class Action Compl., supra note 7.
24. Enrich & Eaglesham, supra note 1.
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claims available to LIBOR plaintiffs, and the likelihood of recovery for
each category of claims. The Note then examines barriers to recovery,
and concludes with observations on the road ahead for LIBOR
litigation.
II. CALCULATING LIBOR
LIBOR is calculated every day around 1:00AM GMT.25
Sixteen reference banks individually submit estimates of how much
interest they would be charged to borrow money from other banks and
institutions to the British Bankers Association (BBA).26 Each reference
bank submits a different estimate for various borrowing periods and
currencies used in interbank financing.27 These estimated quotes are
non-binding, and do not oblige the submitting bank to actually obtain
loans at that rate.28 As of 2008, a separate LIBOR was calculated for
fifteen different borrowing periods and ten currencies. 29  Thomson
Reuters compiles these quotes and calculates the various LIBOR rates.
30
The middle eight quotes are averaged to create each specific LIBOR for
the day.3"
During the most recent financial crisis, the amount of interbank
lending decreased significantly.32  The reference banks did not extend
short-term overnight credit to each other frequently enough to come up
with accurate, meaningful "quotes" for submission to the BBA.33 Credit
quality fluctuations among reference banks and a "deterioration in
liquidity" contributed to speculative quotes.34 The quotes became more
25. Michael J. De La Merced, Q. and A.: Understanding Libor, N. Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/1 0/q-and-a-
understanding-libor/ [hereinafter De La Merced].
26. Peter Eavis & Nathaniel Popper, Libor Scandal Shows Many Flaws in Rate-Setting,
N. Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 19, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/19/LIBOR-
scandal-shows-many-flaws-in-rate-setting/ [hereinafter Eavis & Popper].
27. Id.
28. Jacob Gyntelberg & Phillip Wooldridge, Interbank Rate Fixings During the Recent
Turmoil, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS Q. REV., Mar. 2008, at 65, available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qt0803g.pdf [hereinafter Gyntelberg & Wooldridge].
29. Id. at 69.
30. De La Merced, supra note 25.
31. Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks' Borrowing
Costs? 2 (April 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Snider & Youle].
32. Eavis & Popper, supra note 26.
33. Id.
34. Gyntelberg & Wooldrige, supra note 28, at 71 (arguing that the mechanism for
2013]
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and more speculative as the financial crisis worsened.35  For
sophisticated market observers, it became increasingly apparent that the
quotes underlying LIBOR were really the products of guesswork or,
more troublingly, conscious manipulation.36 As the quotes continued to
diverge from default insurance costs, concerns over the rate's accuracy
prompted analytical studies and eventually spurred investigations.
37
III. WHAT LIBOR MANIPULATION MEANS FOR THE MARKETS
A. Reputational Incentives for Misreporting
Reference banks can profit from an artificially heightened or
lowered LIBOR in different ways.38 Quoting a lower rate makes a bank
appear stronger, thereby assuring its customers that the bank is in a
strong borrowing position and viewed as creditworthy by peer
institutions. 39  In the wake of liquidity insolvencies among several
banks, including Northern Rock and Bear Steams, reference banks
could have underreported interbank rate quotes in an effort to combat
the reputational risks that accurate quotes could have presented during
the financial crisis.40  Despite soaring credit default insurance costs,
calculating LIBOR is not at fault, but rather that the fault lies with the underlying market
volatility and conscious manipulation).
35. See Eavis & Popper, supra note 26.
36. See Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 2 (pointing out that LIBOR's reversal in
relation to the credit default swap spreads made the rate almost completely illogical for
lenders and other financial institutions).
37. Id. at 7-8; Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key
Rate, WALL ST. J. May 29, 2008, at Al, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121200703762027135.html [hereinafter Mollenkamp &
Whitehouse].
38. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 7-8.
39. Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss Pls.' Antitrust Claims at 3, In Re
Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 11 -MD-2262-NRB, 2012 WL
2525270 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) [hereinafter Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot.]. This is a very novel
argument by the defendant banks in an antitrust lawsuit. The defendants claim that if they
were trying to hide their weakness from the public by means of false LIBOR quotes, then
there was no reason for them to collude to do so. Each bank could quote its own lowered
rate. Any antitrust violation would have been detrimental to their misreporting strategy.
40. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 37; Gyntelberg & Wooldrige, supra note
28, at 65 (theorizing that "[i]f there is uncertainty about the liquidity position of a
contributing bank, the bank will be wary of revealing any information that might add to this
uncertainty for fear of increasing its borrowing costs."). See, e.g., Hyun Song Shin,
Reflections on Modem Bank Runs: A Case Study of Northern Rock (August 2008)
(unpublished manuscript) (detailing the events leading up to the bank run on Northern
LIBOR SCANDAL AND LITIGATION
banks continued to underreport interbank borrowing rates in an effort to
assuage market fears over their strength and stability.
4 1
B. Using Manipulation to Profit from Various Financial Contracts
Another incentive for banks to artificially suppress LIBOR
hinges on each bank's portfolio exposure to LIBOR as a reference
rate.42 Interest rate swaps provide an excellent example. Interest rate
swaps use LIBOR more frequently than any other reference rate.43 In
most interest rate swaps, one party exchanges a fixed rate payment in
return for a variable interest rate payment. 44 Interest rate swaps allow
investors to manage exposure to varying interest rates or lock in a lower
interest rate than otherwise possible.45 These contracts are one of the
primary methods employed by corporations, municipalities, and other
investors to hedge against fluctuations in interest rates and fix interest
payments over a period of time.46 The cash flow of an interest rate
swap hinges, to a large degree, on LIBOR.
The Payer and the Receiver are the two parties to an interest rate
swap. The Payer sets a notional value 47 with the Receiver. The Payer
pays a fixed interest rate, agreed upon by the parties, to the Receiver.
The Receiver, in return, pays a floating or variable rate to the Payer. If
"f' is the fixed rate, "Lt" is the variable rate, "t" is the time period of the
Rock).
41. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 37. On January 1, 2007, Citigroup's CDS
spread was approximately five points below its one year LIBOR quote. By January 2009,
Citigroup's CDS spread and its one year LIBOR quote converged just above two. Over the
course of 2009, Citigroup's CDS spread skyrocketed more to almost seven points above its
one year LIBOR quote. It took less than three years for this historical relationship to reverse
by almost twelve points. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 19 (Figure 1); Ansgar Belke &
Christian Gokus, Volatility Patterns of CDS, Bond and Stock Markets Before and During
the Financial Crisis; Evidence from Major Financial Institutions, 243 RUHR ECONOMIC
PAPERS, Feb. 2011, at 9.
42. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 10.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Financial Times Lexicon, FIN. TIMES (2012),
http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=interest-rate-swap (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
45. Id.
46. Gary Gensler, Op-Ed, Libor, Naked and Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2012, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/opinion/LIBOR-naked-and-
exposed.html?_r-0.
47. The notional value is merely a benchmark agreed upon by the parties and, like a
principal, is never actually exchanged between the parties. Snider & Youle, supra note 31,
at 10 n. 10.
2013]
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contract, and "V" is the notional value, then the Payer receives (Lt-f)V
and the Receiver receives (f-Lt)V. A higher variable rate results in a
better return for the Payer, while a lower variable rate results in a better
return for the Receiver.48 If Bank ABC has a large amount of interest
rate swaps outstanding in a given quarter, any fluctuation in LIBOR will
have serious implications for Bank ABC's large portfolio exposure to
LIBOR.49
Assume that Bank ABC has entered into LIBOR-based interest
rate swaps with a total notional value of $100 million as the Receiver.
The term on these swaps is set to end at the conclusion of the current
quarter. The fixed interest rate on these swaps is three percent, and the
fluctuating rate is based on the three-month LIBOR. During this
quarter, for whatever reason, LIBOR has continued to decrease and has
reached 2.7825.50 Bank ABC has made $21,750,000 on its swap
contracts from their potentially defrauded counterparties, in this quarter
alone, because of the slightly decreased LIBOR rate.
The analysis of Connan Snider, an Economics Professor at
University of California, Los Angeles, and Thomas Youle, a doctoral
student in economics at the University of Minnesota, has shown that
once the financial crisis was well underway in 2007, some reference
banks calculated their quotes with the intention of positively affecting
their particular portfolio exposure.51 Snider and Youle released their
study in 2010, and it has since been a key resource for litigants.52
Assume Bank ABC has entered into a large amount of swaps as a
Receiver. As a Receiver in the foregoing example, Bank ABC will
profit on its swaps if LIBOR takes even a slight dip. Thus, Bank ABC
has a strong incentive to influence LIBOR downward. Theoretically,
because LIBOR is the average of the middle eight quotes submitted to
the BBA, a bank seeking to influence the rate in its favor in the
strongest possible way would attempt to set its quotes for the day at the
48. See Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 10.
49. See id.
50. Steve Brown, LIBOR Rates History: Historical LIBOR Rate Information,
FEDPRIMERATE.COM (last updated Dec. 31, 2012),
http://www.fedprimerate.com/LIBOR/LIBOR rates-history.htm. This is the actual three-
month LIBOR as of March 2008. LIBOR dropped 1.1351 points from January to March
2008.
51. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 10. This is the careful conclusion of the study.
52. See, e.g., Class Action Compl., supra note 7, at 6 (citing to Snider and Youle,
supra note 31).
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fourth lowest quote.53 Bank ABC, seeking to lower the LIBOR, aims
for the fourth lowest quote in order to bring the overall LIBOR
downward. 4 A quote at this pivotal point, Snider and Youle argue, will
have the desired impact on LIBOR while avoiding a BBA investigation
into potential manipulation." Bank ABC's daily quotes, aimed at the
fourth lowest quote, could significantly lower the LIBOR, resulting in a
profit for Bank ABC and losses for the Payers who entered swap
agreements with the Bank.
56
If reference banks actually acted on this incentive and pursued
this strategy, we would expect to see bunching of quotes around the
fourth lowest and twelfth highest quotes every day.57 Snider and Youle
calculated the density of the quotes that Citigroup, Bank of America,
JPMorgan, and WestLB submitted to the BBA.58 They found that each
bank's quotes clustered significantly around the fourth lowest quote for
the day. 59 Citigroup and Bank of America consistently submitted
quotes identical to the fourth lowest quote. 60 JPMorgan clustered its
quotes slightly below the fourth lowest quote, while WestLB clustered
its quotes slightly above the fourth lowest quote.6' This clustering
behavior is consistent with a desire on the part of Bank of America and
Citigroup to lower the overall LIBOR, while WestLB does not appear to
have such a desire.62
In May of 2008, Carrick Mollenkamp and Mark Whitehouse,
economic reporters for the Wall Street Journal, conducted a similar
analysis of LIBOR, and compared LIBOR to its traditional indicator,
the default-insurance market.63 The analysis found the two rates usually
rose and fell in tandem. 64 However, as the cost of default insurance
soared in the face of worries over bank closures, LIBOR failed to soar
53. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 2.
54. Id. at 6.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 10.
57. Id. at 2.




62. Id. at 7.
63. Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 37.
64. Id.
2013]
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along with it.65 The analysis does not purport to prove any intentional
manipulation, and cites reasons similar to the Snider and Youle study
for the divergence-dearth of actual interbank lending, accessibility of
Federal Reserve loans, high rates of customer deposits in some banks-
but does note a worrying trend in the first four months of 2008.66
During these months, all sixteen reference banks reported a three-month
rate which remained, on average, within a range of .06%.67 These
extremely similar quotes from each bank directly contradicted the
default-insurance market data, which compared the financial health of
the reference banks.68 For example, on March 10, 2008, the cost of
default insurance for WestLB was twice the cost of default insurance for
Credit Suisse.69 Both banks reported the same LIBOR the next
morning.7 °
The Mollenkamp and Whitehouse study calculated an
alternative LIBOR based on the default-insurance market and its
historical correlation to LIBOR. 71 The study then compared this created
rate to the actual LIBOR rate during the months leading up to the
collapse of Bear Sterns.72 During these months, the cost of default
insurance rose sharply, but the actual LIBOR declined.73 The study's
created rate differs from the actual LIBOR quotes submitted by .87%
for Citigroup, .7% for WestLB, .57% for HBOS, and .42% for UBS.
74
Royal Bank of Canada reported rates closest to the study's created
rate.75 The average difference between the study's created rate and the
actual LIBOR for this period was .25%.76 Following a BBA review of
LIBOR's accuracy in mid-April, this average difference dropped to
.15%. 7 7 This study's creation of an alternative rate, keyed to another
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in the calculation of damages in litigation.
LIBOR manipulation also has a significant impact on the
municipal bond market. This market, comprised of debt offerings from
states, cities, universities, and nonprofits, sees relatively conservative
investing by municipalities attempting to reduce borrowing costs in the
least-risky manner possible.78 Municipal bonds "combine a variable
rate bond with an interest rate swap so that if all works as planned,
borrowers end up with fixed rate financing, at a lower cost of
borrowing., 79  These bonds are designed to protect borrowers from
interest rate fluctuations so that municipalities can obtain predictable
funding for long-term public works, such as transportation systems.
80
The variable rate in a great deal of the interest rate swaps underlying
these municipal bonds was LIBOR.8'
LIBOR manipulation, by altering the underlying interest rate
swaps, prevented the swaps from pairing with the variable rate bond to
produce the fixed rate sought by municipalities. 82 LIBOR manipulation
thus had a ripple effect throughout the municipal bond market and
caused several municipalities, like the city of Baltimore, to pay more on
their bonds than originally anticipated. 83  Some municipalities are
paying above-market rates as high as 6% in return for payments from
banks as low as .5%.84 These bonds are extremely difficult to
refinance. 85 New York State has paid $243 million in order to get out of
debt deals containing swap agreements. 86 Municipalities vary in their
overall use of municipal bonds with underlying LIBOR-tied interest rate
swaps. North Carolina, for example, has over $1.3 billion in two
78. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, Professor of Practice Fin., Univ. of N.C.
Kenan-Flagler Bus. Sch., in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 6, 2012). For more of Professor
Arapoglou's thoughts on the LIBOR scandal, see Alexander Arapoglou & Jeri-Lynn
Scofield, Six Ways Big Banks Screwed Grandma, SALON (July 7, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/07/27/six-ways-big-banks-screwed-grandma/.
79. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, supra note 78.
80. Gretchen Morgenson, How Banks Could Return the Favor, N.Y. TIMES, June 10,
2012, at BU1.
81. See Nathaniel Popper, Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012, 9:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/1O/LIBOR-rate-
rigging-scandal-sets-off-legal-fights-for-restitution/.
82. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, supra note 78.
83. Popper, supra note 81.
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interest rate swap agreements.8 7 LIBOR manipulation directly affects
the state's treasury.
LIBOR is the reference rate for a vast collection of other
financial instruments. Many investments, thought to be relatively stable
stores of value, saw diminished returns because of understated
LIBOR. 8 For instance, income from traditional money market funds
lost as much as 2% due to LIBOR manipulation. 89 Almost half of all
adjustable-rate mortgages in the United States use LIBOR as the
reference rate. 90  Analysts have determined that the holder of a
$100,000 mortgage was $50 to $100 worse off every month because of
LIBOR manipulation.9' LIBOR manipulation may have cost Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac as much as $3 billion, according to an
unpublished report from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
92
Pension funds also use the LIBOR rate in order to protect
against risks and lock in predictable returns. 93 Pensions hold floating
rate bonds with payments based upon LIBOR.94  Consequently, the
return rates for pensions are reduced as LIBOR is lowered.95 This
leaves pensioners and companies in the lurch to make up the difference
between the expected and actual returns. 96  Determining the overall
losses or gains from LIBOR manipulation in any given fund is a
complicated process because of various hedging strategies employed by
87. Interview by Maria Bartiromo with Janet Cowell, N. C. State Treasurer (Sept. 5,
2012), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000114025.
88. Kirsten Grind, What Libor Means for You, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2012, at B8,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 10000872396390443545504577565120728037852.html.
89. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, supra note 78.
90. Gensler, supra note 46.
91. James Nye, LIBOR Scandal Rocks U.S. as Experts Warn it Could be 'the Biggest
Consumer Fraud in History,' DAILYMAIL (July 12, 2012),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2172377/LIBOR-scandal-rocks-US-experts-warn-
biggest-consumer-fraud-history.html.
92. Enrich & Eaglesham, supra note 1.
93. Popper, supra note 81.
94. Christopher Barker, The $800 Trillion Scandal: How Banks' LIBOR Lies Affected
You, Daily Finance, AOL MONEY & FIN. (July 9, 2012),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2012/07/09/the-800-trillion-scandal-how-banks-libor-lies-
affected-you/.
95. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, supra note 78 (arguing that these losses,




2013] LIBOR SCANDAL AND LITIGATION
fund managers. 97  CalPERS, as well as several other managers of
pension funds, are conducting reviews to determine the overall effect
that LIBOR manipulation made on their funds.
98
Seventy percent of the U.S. futures market uses LIBOR as the
reference rate.99 Lenders often use LIBOR as a baseline interest rate
before adjusting on a borrower-specific basis. 100 Approximately half of
variable-rate student loans use LIBOR. 101 Some estimates indicate that
$800 trillion in loans and securities are tied to LIBOR.1°2 The LIBOR
scandal has also exposed banks to regulatory and litigation losses,
hurting shareholders by dropping stock prices.
10 3
This pervasive use of LIBOR creates an impressive array of
potential litigants. Any entity on the losing side of a LIBOR-related
contract could seek relief for damages resulting from LIBOR
manipulation. Commentators estimate the potential losses from
LIBOR-related litigation range from $6 billion to $35 billion, and could
potentially even reach $1 trillion.'
0 4
97. Ross Kerber, Analysis: Funds May Have Won and Lost in Libor scandal, REUTERS
(July 17, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/us-libor-funds-
idUSBRE86GOYK20120717.
98. Id.
99. Gensler, supra note 46.
100. See Behind the LIBOR Scandal, N. Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 10, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/07/10/business/dealbook/behind-the-libor-
scandal.html.
101. Id. (showing the progression of the scandal in graphical form).
102. Barker, supra note 94.
103. See, e.g., Andrew Harris et al., Wall Street Bank Investors in Dark on Libor
Liability, BLOOMBERG (July 5, 2012, 3:44 PM), http://bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-
05/wall-street-bank-investors-in-dark-on-libor-liability.html (showing that Barclays stock
dropped 16% the day after the regulatory fine was announced).
104. See Charles Riley, Banks Face Billions More in LIBOR Losses, CNNMONEY (July
13, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/13/investing/libor-bank-losses/index.htin (quoting
a $6 billion estimate from Morgan Stanley); see also Lina Saigol et al., Underwriters Eye
Banks' LIBOR Exposure, FIN. TIMES (July 31, 2012),
http://www.ft.com/intllcms/s/9c359500-d738-1 lel-8c7d-
00 144feabdc0,Authorised=false.html? i location http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com%2Fcms
%2Fs%2F0%2F9c359500-d738-1 Ie 1 -8c7d-
00 144feabdc0.html&_i referer=http%3A%2F%2Fsearch.ft.com%2Fsearch%3FqueryText%
3Dunderwriters%2BLIBOR%2Bexposure#axzz289W5E3Ei (citing even higher litigation
estimates from plaintiffs law firms).
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IV. CLAIMS AVAILABLE TO LIBOR PLAINTIFFS
A. Antitrust Claims
The composite nature and overall downward trend of LIBOR
has compelled some plaintiffs to pursue antitrust claims against the
reference banks collectively. In order to prevail on an antitrust claim,
plaintiffs face the difficult burden of proving collusion on the part of the
banks.105  In an antitrust action, plaintiffs must allege an actual
agreement among the market competitors to restrain competition in a
specific market.10 6 Once plaintiffs allege sufficient facts to overcome
this initial test, they must allege enough bank action to constitute a
"restraint of trade." 10 7 A restraint of this sort violates section 1 of the
Sherman Act.
10 8
In a motion to dismiss antitrust allegations filed on June 29,
2012, Bank of America and Credit Suisse ("Defendants") outlined the
weaknesses of antitrust claims in the LIBOR context.109 In support of
their motion, Defendants argued that reference banks may have
individually attempted to manipulate LIBOR, but there is little evidence
that they actively colluded in order to influence it in one direction.110
Furthermore, LIBOR is not the "price" of anything and there is no
market in regard to reporting rates.'11 According to the Defendants,
false reporting is not "a competitive act, and does not restrain trade in
any market."" 2 If the individual quotes were merely factored into an
index, not a price, then the quotes could not have restrained the trade of
anything. "'
3
The specific proof of collusion and price-fixing needed to win
antitrust claims will make antitrust claims extremely difficult for
LIBOR plaintiffs." 4  The UBS settlement has provided antitrust
105. See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot., supra note 39, at 10.
106. Jd. This initial test is known as the Twombly test. See Bell Atlantic Co. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
107. Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot., supra note 39, at 22.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
109. See Mem. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot., supra note 39.
110. Seeid. at lO.
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Eaglesham, supra note 22.
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claimants with a potential source of valuable evidence. Regulators have
determined that Thomas Hayes, the UBS trader at the center of the
LIBOR manipulation, worked with traders at four other banks in order
to rig the rate. 11 5 Hayes also worked with outside brokers, who in turn
worked with other reference banks to help set the LIBOR quote for the
day.1 16 In an email from one of these brokers, other reference banks
were characterized as "sheep" that would hopefully just fall in line with
the quotes of the banks rigging the rate." 7 If available, communications
similar to this email will provide valuable ammunition to antitrust
claimants seeking to paint a picture of collusion across the reference
banks.
B. Fraud Claims
Although fraud is a cause of action in both tort and contract law,
many states do not distinguish between the two versions of the claim.
1 8
A fraud claim must allege five elements: (1) representation, (2) falsity,
(3) scienter, (4) deception, and (5) injury. In contract law, damages are
generally designed to move the aggrieved party forward and give the
aggrieved party the benefit of its bargain. Successful fraud plaintiffs, on
the other hand, are restored to the status quo ante, instead of being
awarded the lost benefit of the bargain." 9 However, most jurisdictions
mix tort and contract law to supplement these restitutionary contract
damages with consequential tort damages, essentially compensating the
aggrieved party for the loss of the bargain. 120  Additionally, when a
party has misrepresented a fact that the contract requires the party to
disclose, punitive damages may be awarded. 12' Therefore, fraud claims,
whether in tort or contract law, provide a sophisticated measurement of
damages with the potential for large awards.
The Southern District of New York has recently consolidated a
115. Enrich & Eaglesham, supra note 1.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 7 ARTHURL. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 28.13 (Joseph M. Perillo et at. eds., 2002).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Gregory v. Chemical Waste Management, 38 F. Supp. 2d 598 (W.D. Tenn.
1996) (awarding punitive damages for falsely calculating royalties).
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host of LIBOR lawsuits into one massive class action.' 22 Berkshire
Bank and a class of similarly situated banks and holding companies
brought a claim under the common law tort of fraud, alleging that the
banks submitted materially false quotes to the BBA with the
understanding that those quotes would be disseminated throughout the
financial services industry.' 23  The complaint states that the banks
succeeded in bringing LIBOR down, thereby enhancing their profits.
124
The complaint further alleges that the banks knew of the falsity of their
quotes, and recklessly disregarded actual interbank rates.1
25
Actual interbank loans were uncommon during the financial
crisis. Proving that banks "recklessly disregarded the falsity"' 26 of their
quotes during these uncertain times is a significant barrier to recovery.
Proving reckless disregard will present similar challenges to those faced
by antitrust plaintiffs, who will have to allege a specific degree of
manipulation.
127
For a successful fraud claim, the class must prove that the
reference banks intended to induce the plaintiffs' reliance on the
manipulated quotes. The class has alleged that the reference banks'
"only" reason for issuing false quotes was to induce the BBA to rely on
those quotes in setting LIBOR. 128  This is a calculated, strategic
decision on the part of the class. On one hand, it almost looks as if the
class is suing on behalf of the BBA. The class could have trouble
connecting a reference bank's quote to the BBA, to the LIBOR
composite rate, and to the investments in question, if they alleged that
the banks intended the class to rely on the quotes. Ultimately, the class
relied on LIBOR. The individual quotes were small parts of the
composite rate, but were the underlying determinants of LIBOR.
Reference banks should not avoid liability simply because they
indirectly, instead of directly, manipulated LIBOR.
The class contends that it relied on these false quotes by relying
122. See Chris Bruce, New York Bank Files Class Suit on LIBOR, Says Fraud by 21
Firms Hurt Interest Income, BNA BANKING REPORT, July 31, 2012.




127. See supra Part IV. A.
128. Id. at 13.
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on LIBOR. 129 Each member of the class took calculated risks and
bargained for investment returns based on LIBOR as they knew it, not
on the assumption that a manipulated rate would continue to be
depressed:130 The depressed LIBOR formed the basis for interest rate
calculations, and class members issued or received payments based on
these calculations.1 31  The critical role LIBOR plays in these
calculations firmly establishes reliance by the class members.
Furthermore, this reliance on LIBOR was both justifiable and
reasonable because it was the pervasive norm throughout the financial
services industry. 132 The pervasiveness of LIBOR and its global use
certainly establishes the element of "justifiable and reasonable"
reliance.' 
33
The reduced return the class members received on their various
financial contracts constitutes the injury in this claim.' 34 A depressed
LIBOR results in reduced returns for the borrowing class members,
which constitutes injury in fact. The trouble with this element is, as
discussed previously, that determining the extent of those reduced
returns or the amount LIBOR was actually altered is extremely difficult.
Defendant banks can attack the lack of specificity in this element and
expose its weaknesses. The court, however, will have to determine
what constitutes a sufficient allegation of injury in fact for fraud claims
to proceed.
The class then avers that the injury it suffered was proximately
caused by the banks' manipulated quotes, and that LIBOR would not
have been altered but for the banks' conduct.' 35  The manipulated
quotes must have had an impact on the overall LIBOR "[b]ecause of the
mechanical nature of the BBA's calculation."' 136 This is a two-step
causation chain, because the class members then link the returns on
their LIBOR-tied contracts to the BBA's calculation of LIBOR.1
37
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entire fraud, alleging that "due to their own transactions in USD
LIBOR-tied loans and their analyses of credit markets and financial
services firms, Defendants would certainly have understood that
falsifying USD LIBOR quotes would impact adjustable rate loans
issued by other lenders."' 38  This allegation, by highlighting the
expertise of the Defendants, does a good job of tying the fraud claim
together.
Fraud is the most straightforward claim for borrowers and other
parties who use LIBOR. Manipulating LIBOR, whether to improve the
market perception of the bank or profit from large portfolio exposure to
the rate, is "textbook securities fraud."' 139 Civil and criminal penalties
can flow from this fraud, and it should prove a fruitful ground for
litigants.140 Moreover, the UBS settlement has brought several potential
pieces of evidence to light for fraud claimants. Thomas Hayes, the
alleged ringleader of UBS's efforts to rig LIBOR, has been arrested by
British authorities and charged by U.S. prosecutors with fraud. 14' The
regulatory findings include attempts by UBS to bribe employees at
brokerage firms to act as middlemen and coordinate LIBOR
submissions for various reference banks. 142 The findings from the UBS
settlement also include knowledge and involvement of senior
management, possibly imputing them and the institution as a whole with
scienter. 43 The U.S. Department of Justice has decided not to press
charges, but this will not prevent private litigants from using these
findings in their pursuit of civil damages.
44
C. Breach of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claims
Another available claim is the breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. LIBOR plaintiffs allege that the reference
banks breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
138. Id.
139. Interview with Alexander Arapoglou, supra note 78.
140. Peter J. Henning, What the Barclays Settlement Means for Other Banks, N. Y.
TiMEs DEALBOOK (July 3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/03/whats-next-after-
the-barclays-settlement/.
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various financial contracts by manipulating the rate to the advantage of
the reference banks. State law governs the implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing.145  In Delaware, a popular jurisdiction for
corporate litigants, these covenants require that contract parties "act
reasonably upon contractual language that is on its face reasonable.' 46
Courts often imply such a covenant in order "to protect the spirit of an
agreement when, without violating an express term of the agreement,
one side uses oppressive or underhanded tactics to deny the other side
the fruits of the parties' bargain.'
' 47
The court must first determine the "spirit" of the contract by
looking to its express terms.1 48 After deciding the spirit of the contract,
the court attempts to "determine the terms that the parties would have
bargained for" if they had foreseen the circumstance which caused the
litigation.1 49 The court then implies the "extrapolated term" into the
contract in an attempt to resolve the dispute.150 If a party has breached
the extrapolated term, the party has breached the contract.' 51 The court
will fashion relief for a breach of an extrapolated term in the same
manner as a breach of an express term. 1
52
Breach of good faith and fair dealing claims do have significant
limitations. The implied covenant cannot conflict with any of the
provisions of the express agreement.153 The implied covenant is also
limited to the original scope of the agreement.' 54 Direct conflict with an
express provision is straightforward, but the exact "scope" of an
agreement can be the subject of significant disagreement.
Various Schwab short-term bond and liquid assets funds
("Schwab Funds") allege that the reference banks breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the various LIBOR-based
contracts held by the Schwab Funds. 55 The Schwab Funds allege that
145. Chamison v. Healthtrust, Inc., 735 A.2d 912, 920 (Del. Ch. 1999).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 920-921.
149. Id.





155. Am. Compl., supra note 23, at 97-98. The Southern District of New York has
since consolidated the Schwab Funds' lawsuit into the larger Berkshire Bank class action.
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they have performed all of their obligations under the LIBOR-based
contracts, and fulfilled all conditions necessary for the Defendants'
performance. 56 Schwab Funds' amended complaint then goes on to
allege that the Defendants "secretly" manipulated LIBOR downward,
and therefore unfairly interfered with Schwab Funds' "right to receive
the benefits of the subject contracts."'' 57 Schwab Funds' reduced return
on these contracts constitutes the injury in this cause of action.'
58
Instead of focusing on the "spirit" of the contracts or advocating
for any "extrapolated terms," as required under implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing precedent, the Schwab Funds rely on the
complaint's lengthy discussion of LIBOR manipulation by the
Defendants. 59 The court's acceptance of the Schwab Funds' LIBOR
manipulation theory will determine whether enough bad faith has been
established to warrant a breach of this implied covenant. The Schwab
Funds also fail to define or discuss their "right to receive the benefits of
the subject contracts."' 60 Instead of asserting a right, the Schwab Funds
could have chosen to keep the court grounded in contract law by using
language such as "the benefit of the bargain" or framing the loss in
terms of "expectations." The language of this section does not strictly
adhere to tort and contract law elements, but sufficiently alleges the
contours of a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Recovery under this claim will depend upon the court's
acceptance of the Schwab Funds' discussion of LIBOR manipulation.
D. Unjust Enrichment/Disgorgement Claims
Unjust enrichment is a claim in equity available against parties
who have received and retained ill-begotten gains. Unjust enrichment is
usually only available in the absence of an explicit contract between the
parties, but is available in some jurisdictions when the contract is
fraudulent. The plaintiffs in the Berkshire Bank suit claim that it would
See In Re Libor-Based Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. 1:1 1-md-02262-
NRB, 2011 WL 5980198, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011).
156. Ame. Compl., supra note 23, at 98.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id. at 98 (citing to the manipulation "as alleged in the foregoing paragraphs of
this Complaint").
160. Id. at 98.
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be inequitable to allow the banks to retain profits gained from their
manipulation of LIBOR. 61 The plaintiffs request that the court place
the Defendants' unjust gains in a constructive trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff class and/or require the Defendants to pay out restitution to
each individual plaintiff. 
162
The problem with this cause of action is the measure of
damages. It faces all the uncertainty of calculating the "accurate"
LIBOR, but also has the added insecurity of equitable relief. A
constructive trust or a calculation of damages for each individual
plaintiff both require a substantial amount of judicial action.
E. Mutual Mistake Claims
LIBOR plaintiffs could also pursue mutual mistake claims.
The elements of a mutual mistake are: (1) the parties to a contract were
mistaken in their belief regarding a fact; (2) the mistake constitutes a
basic assumption underlying the contract; (3) the mistake had a material
effect on the bargain; and (4) the contract did not put the risk of the
mistake on the party alleging mistake.
163
In very limited circumstances, a party can allege a bona fide
mutual mistake in the contract. 164 A party can only win a mistake claim
if the mistake is a mistake of fact, not a mistake in judgment.
165
Mistakes in judgment are inherent risks in the bargaining process, and
the court will not award relief for such a fundamental contractual
risks. 166 A party does not have a mistake claim solely because the
parties were mistaken "in their prediction of a certain event, or that
conditions would change. 1 67  The mistake cannot be as to a future
event, and the mistake must relate to a basic assumption as to a vital
existing fact.
168
161. Class Action Compl., supra note 7, at 13.
162. Id. at 14.
163. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 229 at 237 (Fed. Cl. 1998)
(citing Dairyland Power Coope. v. United States, 16 F.3d 1197, 1202 (Fed.Cir. 1994)).
164. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 362 (West, 5th ed. 2009)
[hereinafter CALAMARI & PERILLO].
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Fed. Cl. at 237.
168. Id.; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 164.
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Despite these limitations, mutual mistake may hold promise for
LIBOR plaintiffs. None of the LIBOR plaintiffs have alleged a claim of
mutual mistake, despite this claim's fit with the circumstances.
Moreover, mutual mistake is a logical ancillary to fraud claims.
Defendant reference banks can argue good faith as a defense to fraud
claims. If good faith on the part of the reference bank is accepted, this
leads to the conclusion that both parties erroneously believed in
LIBOR's impartiality, thereby establishing a mutual mistake claim. In
the absence of bad faith on the part of the banks, the parties were simply
mistaken in their belief regarding the material fact of LIBOR's status as
an independent benchmark. Because it is a mistake concerning the
factual nature of LIBOR's integrity, this constitutes a mistake of fact,
and not a mistake in judgment. Underlying any financial agreement that
used the rate is the basic assumption that LIBOR is an accurate,
independent rate. LIBOR's independence and accuracy are vital to the
contracts, so any alteration or inaccuracy in LIBOR has material effects
on the bargain. Any defendant would be hard pressed to argue that the
contract put the risk of the mistake on the plaintiff. Plaintiffs who have
gone to the lengths of establishing fraud or antitrust claims can assert
mutual mistake claims as valid fall-back claims. A mutual mistake
claim is a solid additional claim that would enable plaintiffs to recover
even if the court finds no conscious manipulation on the part of the
banks.
F. Frustration of Purpose Claims
Another potential claim available to LIBOR plaintiffs is
frustration of purpose. According to the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, where "a party's principal purpose is substantially frustrated
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of
which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
remaining duties to render performance are discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary."' 169 The party must
prove the "purpose" of the contract, the substantiality of the frustration,
and that the non-occurrence of the frustrating event was a basic
169. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DISCHARGE OF SUPERVENING
FRUSTRATIONS § 265 (1981).
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assumption of the contract. 17  Applying these elements to LIBOR-
related contracts reveals that frustration of purpose is a viable claim for
LIBOR plaintiffs seeking to void contracts on which they have lost
money.
The core purpose of many of the LIBOR-related contracts was
to lock in a predictable interest rate by pairing LIBOR with a fixed
rate.171 The "purpose" that was frustrated must have been the core
purpose the party had in mind when making the contract.1 72  The
frustrated purpose cannot be "some specific object" the party had in
mind, but rather "completely the basis of the contract."' 7'  LIBOR
plaintiffs' desire for a predictable, stable interest rate drove many of
these transactions and could rightly be considered "completely the basis
of the contract."'' 74 The purpose must be so central to the contract that
the transaction simply would not make sense without it.' 75 Some of the
LIBOR-related contracts discussed earlier would not make sense
without the purpose of locking in a fixed interest rate.
Another requirement is that the frustration must have been
"substantial.' 76 Substantial frustration requires more than a showing
that the party will incur unforeseen losses. 17 7 The frustration must be
outside of the assumed risks of the contract and unfairly severe. 78 The
manipulation of LIBOR caused some of the LIBOR plaintiffs to incur
exactly the unforeseen losses which they allege as the harm in their
existing complaints. LIBOR's complete departure from its historical
relationship with the other market rates constitutes an unfairly severe
frustration outside of the assumed risks of the various financial
contracts that use the rate. The typical allegations of injury and harm
that plaintiffs allege in connection with other causes of action satisfy the
element of substantial frustration.
Finally, "the non-occurrence of the frustrating event must have
170. Id. cmt. a.
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been a basic assumption on which the contract was made."'179 Similar to
the first element of frustration, the assumption must have been
extremely central to the contract, a fundamental concept implicit in the
bargain.' 80  The assumption that LIBOR would not crumble entirely
stood at the heart of LIBOR-related contracts. The parties held a basic
assumption that LIBOR would continue in its capacity as a crucial
benchmark rate. Foreseeability plays a significant role in this
determination, but the fact that the event was somewhat foreseeable
does not doom the claim.' 81 The parties did not foresee the LIBOR
scandal, the event which frustrated the purpose of these contracts,
assuming it would continue to maintain its traditional centrality.
Similarly to mutual mistake, the LIBOR plaintiffs have not
alleged any frustration of purpose claims. This is perhaps because the
remedy for frustration of purpose is discharge of the remaining duties
under the contract.' 82  Frustration of purpose will only aid LIBOR
plaintiffs who have outstanding payments due under LIBOR-related
contracts, making it a particularly attractive claim for municipalities
who face high refinance costs. This claim will, however, allow current
or future LIBOR plaintiffs to sustain pleading burdens and avoid further
payments.
V. BARRIERS TO RECOVERY
The composite nature of LIBOR poses significant problems for
all plaintiffs seeking to recover on LIBOR-related contracts. The effect
of one bank's quotes over a given period of time on the overall LIBOR
will be hard to prove. Complex analyses, like the ones conducted by the
Wall Street Journal and Professors Snyder and Youle, are needed in
order to overcome these difficulties and prove injury in fact. 183  In
defense of these claims, each individual reference bank can validly




182. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: DISCHARGE OF SUPERVENING
FRUSTRATIONS § 265 (1981).
183. See Halah Touryalai, LIBOR Lawsuits Are Piling Up And Could Cost Billions,
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LIBOR.'
8 4
Plaintiffs must first prove how many overall percentage points
the manipulation achieved.185  However, concrete interbank data for
actual loans is almost nonexistent because of the dearth of interbank
loans during the financial crisis. Consequently, this determination will
necessarily hinge on a comparison to other market benchmarks, like
CDS spreads and Eurodollar bid rates. 86 Plaintiffs will also have a
difficult time quantifying their damages.1 87 Litigants will spend lots of
time (and money) arguing over the correct method for determining the
alteration percentage.
To date, the consolidated class of plaintiffs in the Southern
District of New York has not alleged a specific amount of damages due
to the class. They assert, however, that these barriers to recovery can be
easily overcome "via discovery and expert testimony."' 88 The plaintiffs
allege that calculation of damages will be straightforward, accomplished
by "the simple process of comparing the interests [plaintiffs] should
have received with what they were actually paid due to the suppressed
LIBOR.'
'1 89
If a manipulation percentage can be proven to a satisfactory
level of definiteness, litigants can calculate their actual damages based
on overall exposure to LIBOR. 190 For example, if the court determines
that LIBOR was artificially lowered by .3%, an investor holding
"interest rate swaps on bonds worth $1 billion" will allege damages of
$3 million a year.' 91 In New York, the Nassau County Comptroller,
George Maragos, has calculated that his county lost $13 million on
outstanding bonds because of LIBOR manipulation. 92 Assuming .3%
as the average level of "skewing, ' 93 a very reasonable percentage based
184. Id.
185. Popper, supra note 81.
186. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 4.
187. Touryalai, supra note 183.
188. Mem. of Law in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 57, In Re Libor-Based
Financial Instruments Antitrust Litigation, No. I 1-MD-2262-NRB 2012 WL 3869968
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).
189. Id.
190. Popper, supra note 81.
191. ld.
192. Id.
193. The "skew" is the change in LIBOR's historical relationship with other market
data. LIBOR typically had a relationship with lending rates in the Eurodollar market and the
Eurodollar rate. Snider and Youle calculate the magnitude of skewing by analyzing
2013] 245
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
on the calculations of Snider and Youle, and applying it to the $1.3
billion in swap exposure posited by N.C. Treasurer Janet Cowell, North




The Barclays fine of June 2012 started what promises to be a
massive flood of litigation focused on the LIBOR scandal. The recent
UBS settlement perhaps provided more in the way of specific findings
and elements of evidence for LIBOR plaintiffs than the Barclays
settlement. The CFTC's UBS report contains four pages of "Examples
of Misconduct From Written Communications," which includes emails
and text messages.' 95  This evidence proves knowledge of senior
management and will fuel the fires of private litigation. 196 Regulatory
findings like these will continue to drive litigation, whether or not they
are as massive and widespread as the ones which led to the UBS and
Barclays settlements. Fear of similar findings coming to light during
the discovery process will bring reference banks to the settlement table.
Despite the advantages given to LIBOR plaintiffs by these
regulatory investigations, there are still significant barriers to recovery.
Disagreements over how to calculate a manipulation percentage from
which to compute damages will prolong litigation. The Mollenkamp
and Whitehouse study keyed its alternative rate to default-insurance
rates, but, as recognized by Snider and Youle, this is but one method for
determining an "accurate" LIBOR. 197 The need for expert financial
testimony and extensive discovery will drive up the cost of litigation.
Ultimately, these barriers will bring LIBOR plaintiffs to the settlement
table.
LIBOR's departure from its usual interaction with these rates. Snider & Youle, supra note
31, at 3.
194. Id. at 9.
195. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,




197. Snider & Youle, supra note 31, at 3-5 (Agreeing with Mollenkamp and
Whitehouse that the default insurance is one of the best correlated market indicators, but
noting that other rates also have a historical relationship with LIBOR); Mollenkamp &
Whitehouse, supra note 37.
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Lawsuits of similar scale have shown that the settlement option
is the most attractive option for reference banks.198  Unless one
reference bank can sufficiently distance itself from the others and can
claim no wrongdoing, it appears to be in the best interest of each
member bank to settle these claims. The reference banks would then
switch to a strategy to give any settlement the force of res judicata in
order to stem the tide of litigation.
The settlement option will also be preferred by government
officials. Concerns over the survival of UBS and its importance to the
financial stability of the global economy led the U.S. Department of
Justice to announce it will not pursue any legal action against the
bank. 199 Many of the LIBOR plaintiffs are the same attorneys general
and regulatory agencies that negotiated settlements in the wake of the
mortgage crisis.2 00 Similar concerns will drive some of the institutional
LIBOR plaintiffs to consider settlement proposals. Although some
LIBOR lawsuits may be litigated to a verdict, it is more likely that these
complex and pervasive claims will be settled, either through private or
government action.
C. COWDEN W. RAYBURN
198. The settlements in the wake of the mortgage crisis, Exxon Valdez spill, and the
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill are similar scandals with massive classes. See, e.g., Order and
Judgment Granting Final Approval of Economic and Property Damages Settlement and
Confirming Certification of the Economic and Property Damages Settlement Class, In Re:
Oil Spill by the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010
(Dec. 21, 2012) (MDL No. 2179) (establishing a fund for class members).
199. Enrich & Eaglesham, supra note 1.
200. See generally Joint State-Federal Mortgage Servicing Settlement FAQ, NATIONAL
MORTGAGE SETTLEMENT, http://nationalmortgagesettlement.com/faq (site maintained by the
Attorneys General on the Executive Committee that negotiated the settlement detailing the
application process for class members).
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